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Abstract
In recent years much jurisprudential affection has coalesced around the concept of 
the Anthropocene. International lawyers have enlisted among the ranks of humani-
ties and social science authors embracing this proposed scientific time category, and 
putting it to work. This essay draws on sources from a range of fields including legal 
anthropology and critical legal theory in re-examining the reception of the Anthro-
pocene in international law, focusing on its mythical qualities. We demonstrate how 
the Anthropocene both reinforces and meshes perfectly with the three narrative pil-
lars of contemporary international environmental law: evolutionary progress; uni-
versal evaluations of nature and constructions of legal subjectivity; and legal mon-
ism. The Anthropocene, like few ideas in modern scholarship, is quite expressly a 
tale of origins explaining and legitimating its narrators’ place in the universe. Join-
ing signposts such as The Tragedy of the Commons, the Myth of the Anthropocene 
embeds collective memories eclipsing the need to reconsider complex and contested 
histories in understanding the contemporary roles of law in mediating people’s rela-
tions with nature. In response, we call for a more inclusive account of environmen-
tal law that draws on diversity rather than universality, with particular sensitivity to 
those perspectives that are inadvertently excluded from the Anthropocene discourse.
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1 Introduction
‘Here is the Mirror of Galadriel. I have brought you here so that you may look 
in it, if you will.’
‘What shall we look for, and what shall we see?’
‘Many things I can command the Mirror to reveal, and to some I can show 
what they desire to see. But the Mirror will also show things unbidden, and 
those are often stranger and more profitable than things we wish to behold. 
What you will see, if you leave the Mirror free to work, I cannot tell. For it 
shows things that were, and things that are, things that yet maybe. But which it 
is that he sees, even the wisest cannot always tell.
Do you wish to look?’1
In recent years much jurisprudential affection has coalesced around the concept of 
the Anthropocene. International lawyers have enthusiastically enlisted among the 
ranks of humanities and social science authors embracing this proposed scientific 
time category, and putting it to work. In this article we critically re-examine sugges-
tions that the Anthropocene brings paradigmatic change in social realms—‘a seis-
mic shift in human affairs on a par with the Enlightenment’2—by looking beneath 
and beyond any actual data and decisions that may one day result in the Anthropo-
cene being officially declared in geological science. Informed by legal anthropology 
and critical legal theory, we focus on the concept’s mythic qualities. In exploring 
those qualities, we do not dispute that the planet is ‘on the brink of human-induced 
ecological disasters that could change life on Earth as we know it’, nor that the rapid 
environmental changes result from human activity.3 Instead, we argue that the poten-
tial of the Anthropocene to provide a radical new epistemological framework that 
could shape the future of international environmental law4 should be approached 
with deep suspicion and extreme caution. Caution is particularly warranted where 
calls are made to ‘reform’ well-established principles of international environmental 
law and international human rights law.
What is the Anthropocene? Separate from any significance that may ultimately be 
decided in the field of geological categorization, in social science and legal literature 
it has been embraced as ‘a powerful narrative’5 that ‘focuses on the very essence 
of life on earth in its greatest totality’.6 At a pragmatic level, it has been welcomed 
as ‘a useful concept to help leverage and (re-)focus our efforts’7 and ‘a politically 
savvy way of presenting to non-scientists the sheer magnitude of global biophysical 
1 Tolkien (1954), ch. 7.
2 Morrow (2017), p. 269.
3 Kotzé (2017), p. vii.
4 In this article we adopt Brownlie’s broad definition of international environmental law as ‘nothing 
more, or less, than the application of international law to environmental problems and concerns’. See 
Brownlie (1988).
5 Lovbrand et al. (2010), p. 211.
6 Kotzé (2014), p. 130.
7 Biermann et al. (2016), p. 341.
443Primal Scene to Anthropocene: Narrative and Myth in…
123
change’.8 At the same time, Hamilton expresses alarm that the concept ‘is bedevilled 
by misunderstandings’ of those who ‘misinterpret the Anthropocene in a way that 
deprives it of its profound significance’,9 whereas for Oldfield ‘it has already been 
overtaken by the flood of new publications, exhibitions, media statements and events 
that use or abuse the term’ and so there is no ‘way of avoiding acceptance of multi-
ple usage, with informal definitions and formulations alongside a rigorous definition 
in terms of [Earth System Science]’.10 In sum, many scholars claim the Anthropo-
cene to be profoundly significant, yet there is scant agreement upon the nature of 
that significance.
The most common ontological revelation attributed to the Anthropocene is that it 
is post-Cartesian: ‘it demolishes residual assumptions of humanity as somehow dis-
tinct from nature’.11 This understanding is driven by the apparent ability of humans 
to collectively change the parameters of the earth’s geological system.12 Against 
this backdrop, the argument is made that existing international environmental law 
is an ineffective resource for addressing the challenges presented by the Anthropo-
cene.13 Indeed, in international environmental law scholarship the Anthropocene is 
said to require deep reflection and radical action. Kotzé suggests that ‘people will 
have to rethink their own place in the Anthropocene’ because it ‘demands from soci-
ety […] not to continue to be blinded by ideological palliatives such as “sustainable 
development”’.14 He also claims the Anthropocene serves as ‘a powerful metaphor 
for an important normative and analytical engagement with questions of human 
responsibility’.15 Vidas, Zalasiewicz and Williams assert that ‘[t]he conditions of 
the Anthropocene will bring a fundamental shift of the context in which interna-
tional law operates—a shift in which the challenges are increasingly recognized as 
the consequences of natural, not only political, change’.16 Stephens and Robinson 
refer to the Anthropocene in terms almost reminiscent of Year Zero: ‘The Anthropo-
cene has brought an end to the history of international environmental law as we have 
known it because it is now manifest that the human and natural spheres are insepa-
rable’.17 Stephens argues that this is evidenced by the failure of ‘most accounts of 
international environmental law to come to grips with the immense consequences 
that the Anthropocene poses for global environmental governance’.18 For Robinson, 
8 Castree (2014), p. 247.
9 Hamilton (2016), p. 93.
10 Oldfield (2016), p. 169.
11 Dalby (2014), p. 5; see also Stephens (2017). Stephens argues that ‘[A]s humanity is now transform-
ing the planet’s biophysical systems, and imperilling their functioning, the Anthropocene entails the col-
lapse of the human/nature distinction’ (p. 32).
12 Dalby (2014), p. 4.
13 Kotzé and Muzangaza (2018), p. 279.
14 Kotzé (2014), pp. 135, 137.
15 Ibid., p. 155.
16 Vidas et al. (2015), p. 4.
17 Stephens (2017), pp. 31, 54.
18 Ibid., p. 32.
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the Anthropocene presents far-reaching implications for international environmen-
tal law so that long-standing assumptions are no longer valid.19 We must thus start 
again:
The many, independent and re-iterative efforts to frame new statements of 
‘rights’ illustrate the human quest for [ethical] guidance. Religion has often 
provided it; secular civil rights or socialist proclamations address this need. 
The Anthropocene begins the search all over again, in a new time and under 
new conditions.20
For Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos the Anthropocene ‘opens up a different tem-
porality and depth of thinking’21 and for Morrow it demands ‘nothing less than a 
wholesale refashioning of the human/environment paradigm’.22
What remains under-discussed, however, is that the Anthropocene is a paradigm 
shift in physical science only if the paradigmatic bar is set low; such is the continu-
ity of Earth System Science (ESS) with previous research.23 Moreover, this central 
ethical aspiration associated with the adoption of the Anthropocene in legal scholar-
ship is founded on a paradox: Cartesian dualism is finally overcome by embracing a 
concept that further cements the human subject as the central premise of law.
Hornborg and Malm expose a yet deeper layer of the Anthropocene’s contradic-
tory core:
The main paradox of the narrative, if not of the concept as such, becomes vis-
ible: [global environmental change] is denaturalised in one moment—relo-
cated from the sphere of natural causes to that of human activities—only to be 
renaturalised in the next, when derived from an innate human trait, such as the 
ability to control fire. Not nature, but human nature—this is the Anthropocene 
displacement.24
A related problem is that the Myth of the Anthropocene purports a historically 
privileged category of humankind that is not reflective of humanity as a whole.25 In 
doing so, it both reinforces and meshes perfectly with the three narrative pillars of 
contemporary international environmental law: evolutionary progress; universalist 
constructions of nature and legal subjectivity; and legal monism. Joining signposts 
such as The Tragedy of the Commons, the Myth of the Anthropocene embeds collec-
tive memories, eclipsing the need to reconsider complex and contested histories in 
understanding the roles law plays in mediating people’s relationships with nature. In 
response, we call for an account of international environmental law that is grounded 
in an attitude of critical legal pluralism, with particular sensitivity to postcolonial, 
24 Malm and Hornborg (2014), p. 65.
25 Grear (2017), p. 79.
19 Robinson (2014b), p. 13.
20 Ibid., p. 24.
21 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos (2017), p. 120; see also Stephens (2017), p. 32.
22 Morrow (2017), p. 269.
23 Oldfield (2016), p. 165.
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feminist and indigenous perspectives that remain largely excluded from international 
environmental law discourse. At the same time, we caution against discrediting 
well-established principles of international environmental law and human rights law, 
arguing that reinforcing, respecting and operationalising these principles is becom-
ing ever more important in the face of today’s environmental crises.
2  Myth in (International Environmental) Law
Why is the concept of the Anthropocene resonating at such a deep level in interna-
tional environmental law scholarship? We suggest the answer lies at the source—the 
source of law being myth. It is widely accepted within legal anthropology that tra-
ditional or customary law is founded in mythological narrative. A defining feature 
of post-renaissance civilization is supposedly its rejection of myth in favour of rea-
son, yet critical theorists have long suggested otherwise. Myth provides foundations; 
myths ‘are world-creating and, no less important, world-legitimating and world-har-
monizing’.26 Myth ‘is not fixed beyond historical contingency, but rather it exists 
as a shifting mosaic of fragments subject to social pressures’.27 Westerners are not 
defined by a rejection of myth but rather by its internal and external repression; ours 
is the myth of mythlessness.28
Malinowski succinctly appraises myth’s place in premodern and customary 
societies:
Myth fulfils […] an indispensable function: it expresses, enhances and codi-
fies belief; it safeguards and enforces morality; it vouches for the efficiency of 
ritual and contains practical rules for the guidance of man. Myth is thus a vital 
ingredient of human civilisation; it is not an idle tale, but a hard-worked active 
force […] a pragmatic charter of primitive faith and moral wisdom.29
Rouland concurs: ‘Myth is narrative in which the fundamental explanations 
regarding the creation of the universe, the origins of life in society and the main 
rules by which society is governed all reside’.30
Hegel’s The Struggle of Enlightenment with Superstition succinctly frames myth’s 
re-entry into modernity: ‘It will yet be seen whether enlightenment can continue in 
its state of satisfaction; that longing of the troubled beshadowed spirit, mourning 
over the loss of its spiritual world, lies in the background. Enlightenment has on it 
this stain of unsatisfied longing’.31 In the twentieth century, some of those in agree-
ment with Hegel, including Marx, invested in a cleansing iconoclasm, imagining 
26 Manderson (2003), p. 88.
27 Von Hendy (2002), p. 218.
28 Fitzpatrick (1992), p. 160.
29 Malinowski (1926), p. 82.
30 Rouland (1994), p. 157.
31 Hegel (1967), p. 589.
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a world purged of myth, whereas others viewed Hegel’s stain and announced it a 
birthmark.
Modern law, for the overwhelming majority, allegedly has no need of myth. Neg-
ative connotations have been ascribed to myth as it is considered contrary to Western 
notions of ‘the indivisibility of truth’ that are fundamental to modernity.32 Moder-
nity is believed to emanate from a ‘primal scene’,33 embodying an identity reflec-
tive of a ‘culmination yet negation of all that preceded it’.34 Cover first unmasked 
myth’s continuing foundational significance for modern law in the seminal Nomos 
and Narrative:
No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that 
locate it and give it meaning. For every constitution there is an epic, for each 
decalogue a scripture. Once understood in the context of the narratives that 
give it meaning, law becomes not merely a system of rules to be observed, but 
a world in which we live.35
Among the handful of legal scholars who have since sought to reveal myth’s role 
in contemporary state-centred law36 are Fitzpatrick and Manderson. For them the 
myth at the very heart of modern law is myth’s own repression.37 The Eurocentric 
and colonially-rooted belief that ‘the very idea of myth typifies “them”—the savages 
and ancestors “we” have left behind’, Fitzpatrick argues, is itself evidence of the 
existence and prevalence of myth in modern law.38 Modernity is achieved through 
a ‘process of becoming that locates all that was a prelude to and increment towards 
all that will be’.39 In highlighting these contradictions Fitzpatrick reasons that myth 
is modernity’s—a world order is constantly created out of chaos—precreation.40 
Manderson concurs: ‘[A]ll law must have a foundation in non-law, in illegality or 
violence, which is only capable of being legitimised after the fact’.41 In the absence 
of myth, a unified law that coherently brings together its fundamental contradictory 
existences cannot exist.42 To this end, a refusal to accept that law continues into the 
present to be a product of myth is in essence ‘a denial of that which gives law coher-
ent existence’.43
Where might we find myths of modern law? Holmes exquisitely frames its central 
trope in a passage emblazoned upon a UC Berkeley School of Law building wall:
32 Fitzpatrick (1992), p. 20.
33 Hart (1961), p. 195.
34 Marx (1973), p. 106.
35 Cover (1983), pp. 4–5.
36 Fitzpatrick (1992); Manderson (2003); Cover (1983); Schroeder (2009).
37 Manderson (2003), pp. 87–88; Fitzpatrick (1992), p. ix.
38 Fitzpatrick (1992), p. 44.
39 Ibid., p. 28.
40 Ibid., p. 25.
41 Manderson (2003), p. 89.
42 Fitzpatrick (1992), p. 12.
43 Ibid.
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When I think thus of the law, I see a princess mightier than she who wrought 
at Bayeux, eternally weaving into her web dim figures of the ever-lengthening 
past—figures too dim to be noticed by the idle, too symbolic to be interpreted 
except by her pupils, but to the discerning eye disclosing every painful step 
and every world-shaking contest by which mankind has worked and fought its 
way from savage isolation to organic social life.44
From Hobbes to Hart to Holmes to Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons, ‘time and 
again, our legal culture retells the story of how we sacrificed the state of nature and 
submitted instead to a legal order marked by objectivity and obedience’.45 Here, 
‘modernity is to be desired because it supplies that which primitive society suppos-
edly lacks […] it gives us the gift of the rule of law’.46 Law’s objectivity matched 
against the submission of its subjects are the terms of this settlement. This is equally 
true for international environmental law, which aims for stability in international 
relations while at the same time representing the belief that ‘nature’ can be mastered 
and regulated.47 At the roots of this belief is the story of modernity, which ‘is always 
told as a tragedy and as a loss of innocence, but nonetheless necessary for that’.48 
For Fitzpatrick, the very fact that the concept of law includes this deliberate contrast 
is proof of the existence of myth.
Like all myths, the birthing story of law is retold in many variants, in many set-
tings. Births, whether of people or legal systems, are often characterized by pain, 
blood and death. Among the functions of legal myth is that of a social endorphin 
anesthetizing and restructuring shared cultural memories such that narratives of 
wondrous genesis eclipse losses and traumas. Manderson terms this a ‘psychologi-
cal cummerbund’ dramatising and ornamenting ‘the cleavage that lies at the origin 
of any normative system, the moment of its foundation, making a virtue of neces-
sity’.49 Myth is also constitutive; it moulds legal subjects.50 Manderson draws upon 
a metaphor of stellar constellations, illustrating how different cultures view the 
same randomly positioned stars and in them discover patterns giving rise to differ-
ent stories. The ‘patterns are not “in” the stars but in the stories under the influence 
of which they are approached and indeed rendered comprehensible’.51 Playing an 
analogous role in relation to social facts, legal myths lay down paths of understand-
ing and evaluation via which individuals locate themselves and navigate a world of 
jumbled meaning. In this perspective myths are ‘neither true nor false, but a way of 
becoming true, and of making us true to their premises and promises’.52
45 Hobbes (1968), chapters 1–16; Hart (1961); Hardin (1968).
46 Schroeder (2009), p. 139; Hart (1961).
47 Vidas et al. (2015), p. 4; Humphreys and Otomo (2016), p. 802.
48 Manderson (2003), p. 88.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid., p. 90.
52 Ibid.
44 Our source is the wall at Berkeley; research indicates it is an excerpt from a speech given to the Suf-
folk Bar Association, 5 February 1885.
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Returning to the primal scene, the birthing story of law presents a conundrum 
for environmental jurisprudence: are Eden’s occupants ecologically noble savages 
in possession of a received natural law? Or, as law’s origin myth suggests, is the pri-
mal scene populated only by isolated, brutal, lawless savages? The classic literature 
relies upon both of these incompatible assumptions, sometimes with a single con-
tributor oscillating from one to the other.53
Having emerged, what then happens to modern law? In a word, it evolves. From 
myth to law, savage to civilized, simple to complex, innocent to mature, female to 
male, speaking to writing, custom to state, faith to reason, vulnerable to strong, arbi-
trary to accountable, common property to private property, local village market to 
global free market, national to international, developing to developed. The legal evo-
lutionary road, with an occasional twist or turn, leads toward the most mythical of 
places: progress. This, we argue, is the first narrative pillar of international environ-
mental law.
3  The Myth of Evolutionary Progress in International Environmental 
Law
Evolutionary theory entered writing about law centuries before Darwin, with promi-
nent contributors including Aristotle, Plato, Aquinas, Maine, Durkheim, Hart and 
Luhmann, fronting a legion of implicit adherents. Tamanaha digests the evolution-
ary legal narrative as positing ‘an initial primordial soup in which habit and custom 
are dominant in the maintenance of social order, supplemented by an indistinguisha-
ble mix of religious or mystical beliefs and morality’.54 Positive law emerges ‘in the 
haze of long forgotten yesteryear, as a distinct mechanism of institutionalised norm 
enforcement out of the customary order that prevailed in pre-political society’.55 
Eliot, even when limiting the field to those suggesting ‘law is shaped by its environ-
ment in a way that is analogized explicitly to the theory of evolution in biology’, 
discovers numerous contributors in each of the four streams he identifies: social, 
doctrinal, economic and sociobiological.56 Surrounding this germ of evolutionary 
legal theory is a much larger endosperm of literature expressing parallel thoughts 
and applying evolutionary terms without explicitly referencing any biological the-
ory. As Eliot observes:
[T]he idea that law ‘evolves’ is so deeply ingrained in Anglo-American legal 
thought that most lawyers are no longer even conscious of it as a metaphor. 
We speak of the law ‘adapting’ to its social, cultural, and technological envi-
ronment without the slightest awareness of the jurisprudential tradition we are 
invoking.57
53 See for example Bosselmann (2015), pp. 44–61 and Burdon (2012), p. 28.
54 Tamanaha (2001), p. 52.
55 Ibid.
56 Eliot (1985), p. 39.
57 Ibid., p. 38.
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Just as Eliot discovered in the discipline more broadly, the language of biological 
evolution casually infuses much international environmental law discourse. Some 
scholars who are unconcerned with specific theories of legal evolution nevertheless 
refer to international environmental law that adapts and evolves58 while others write 
about succeeding generations of environmental law59; a conceptualisation that is 
also widely used in international human rights discourse.60 These characterisations 
sit uncomfortably with a substantial body of anthropological evidence indicating 
that there is no such thing as universal legal evolution. Instead, the evidence reveals 
tremendous variety in the development of law and legal systems even across socie-
ties with comparable socio-economic characteristics. Accordingly, Hoebel observes 
that ‘there has been no straight line of development in the growth of law’.61 Stein 
adds that ‘There is no automatic connection between a particular level of cultural 
development and particular legal techniques or ideas’.62 We therefore argue that the 
essence of evolution as a narrative signifier resides more in the implied conceptual 
boundaries it builds and rebuilds than in any capacity to accurately convey legal or 
social phenomena.
In the remainder of this section we consider three specific variants of the evolu-
tionary narrative in contemporary international environmental law—evolved ethics, 
sociobiology and the neoromantic—to illustrate evolution’s conceptual malleability 
and the ways in which proposals for a new geological age—the Anthropocene—both 
reinforce and are pre-empted by these theories.
3.1  Evolved Ethics
Bosselmann was among the first international environmental law scholars to use 
evolution to analogize changes in environmental law, presenting an ‘evolution-
ary model of law in seven stages regarding the environment’ encompassing ‘every 
community that is organized as a state’.63 While noting that ‘each legal system dis-
plays its own peculiarities and none will exactly fit’ he nevertheless insists that it 
‘is important to recognize the basic patterns within the seven stages’.64 The evolu-
tionary progression commences at stage one, where ‘law basically regulates existing 
private interests’ in the absence of ‘environmentally-related norms’, and progresses 
to stage seven in which the ‘characteristic legal instrument is the recognition of an 
independent dignity and legal subjectivity of the natural with-world’.65 Bosselmann 
regards stages six and seven, while unattained, to be ‘no longer utopian’ in places 
63 Bosselmann (1995), p. 120.
64 Ibid., p. 123.
65 Ibid., p. 127.
58 Stephens (2017), pp. 49–50; Kotzé (2017), p. viii; Ivanova and Escobar-Pemberthy (2017), p. 170.
59 Gunningham and Holley (2016), p. 273; Arnold (2011), p. 771; Angelo (2006), p. 105; Esty (2001–
2002), p. 183.
60 Vasak (1977), pp. 30–31; for a critical account see Jensen (2017).
61 Hoebel (1968), p. 288.
62 Stein (1980), p. 127.
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such as Germany and the USA.66 A clear implication is that these jurisdictions have 
progressed the furthest along the legal evolutionary path.
Bosselmann includes an adapted version of a figure—‘The Evolution of Eth-
ics’—drawn from Nash’s seminal volume The Rights of Nature.67 The figure illus-
trates Nash’s central theory that human ethical development is an ‘expanding circle’ 
wherein ‘environmental ethics’ emerge naturally in societies that succeed in attain-
ing an advanced stage of social and intellectual evolution, until finally they recog-
nize nature as ‘the latest minority deserving a place in the sun of liberal tradition’.68 
Nash links his expanding circle to specific positive legal developments, beginning 
with the Magna Carta of 1215.69 According to Nash, the US Endangered Species 
Act of 1973 marks the entry of ‘the rights of nature’.70 Nash’s social evolutionary 
theory, read from a post-colonial Pacific island perspective—that of societies who at 
the time of the Magna Carta had in place marine conservation systems of a scale and 
complexity that would not arise in the US or Europe for centuries hence71—appears 
somewhat, well, mythic:
[E]thics awaited the development of an intelligence capable of conceptualizing 
right and wrong. And even then, for long periods of time, morality was usually 
mired in self-interest, as for some it still is. Some people however pushed the 
circle of ethical relevancy outward to include certain classes of human beings 
such as family and tribal members.
Geographic distance ceased to be a barrier in human-to-human ethics, and in 
time people began to shake free from nationalism, racism, sexism […] But 
‘speciesism’ or ‘human chauvinism’ persisted and animal rights was the next 
logical stage in moral extension […] More recently there have been calls for 
‘the liberation of nature’ ‘the liberation of life’ ‘the rights of the planet’ […] to 
be free from human disturbance.72
To take root, narratives of social evolution must be able to merge with other tales 
of legal origin, such as social contracts. Vermeylen does this seamlessly in a chapter 
that considers ‘the ecology of the Anthropocene’ in which she discusses ‘new legal 
terrain’ wherein ‘the laws of nature dictate a new contract between living and non-
living entities in the universe as an ultimate attempt to save the Earth’.73 This is nec-
essary because ‘as we find ourselves in what has been perceived as a new geological 
epoch’ characterised by the longstanding view of nature as a resource for human 
consumption, ‘a human-centric worldview may no longer be tenable’.74 Vermeylen 
66 Ibid., p. 128.
67 Nash (1990).
68 Ibid., p. 213.
69 Ibid., pp. 7, 13–14.
70 Ibid., p. 7.
71 Johannes (2002), p. 317.
72 Nash (1990), p. 6.
73 Vermeylen (2017), p. 139.
74 Ibid., p. 138.
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relies on selected anthropological sources, arguing that anthropology itself has not 
only questioned the way in which humanity perceives nature, but has successfully 
transcended it.75 According to Vermeylen anthropology now provides an under-
standing of ‘how forests think’.76
For Vermeylen the Anthropocene ‘is above all an ethical and normative con-
cept; it is an epoch that demands a new form of governance and law’.77 Inspired by 
Serres78 and Hobbes,79 she advances the idea of ‘signing a contract with Nature’, 
arguing that when ‘humanity formed the state and signed a contract to protect its 
own self-interest’, humans positioned themselves as masters of the natural world.80 
According to Vermeylen human mastery of Nature had the effect of ‘othering’ it as 
‘only civilised men could be legal subjects’.81 However, the Anthropocene demon-
strates Nature’s reclamation of its legal status as a subject of (environmental) law.82 
Similarly to Nash’s account of the evolution of environmental ethics, Vermeylen 
argues that signing a contract with Nature is possible because like the progressive 
broadening of the definition of legal subjects over time encompassing ‘women, 
indigenous peoples and other poor and marginalized groups’ the material expres-
sion of the Anthropocene, namely climate change and environmental degradation, 
demonstrates that Nature can no longer be treated merely as ‘material for appro-
priation’.83 While rightly urging greater engagement between environmental law and 
anthropology, and suggesting that more attention should be paid to the normative 
traditions of indigenous peoples, Vermeylen’s overall narrative of an amended social 
contract binding every human on the planet is one of universal ethical evolution. 
We note the irony that, upon travelling what is portrayed as new legal terrain, one 
arrives at conclusions very similar to those drawn by Bosselmann a generation pre-
viously. The novelty, it seems, is that we are now in the Anthropocene.
The naturalising role of mythopoeia played by social evolutionary perspectives in 
international environmental law merits closer examination. In Mythologies Barthes 
suggests myth is less a concept than a system of communication. For Barthes myth 
is a type of speech ‘defined by its intention [concept] much more than by its lit-
eral sense [form]; and that in spite of this, its intention is somehow frozen, purified, 
made absent by this literal sense’.84 Referring to a magazine cover portraying an 
African colonial soldier saluting the French flag, Barthes argues that the function of 
myth is not to deny, but rather to talk about things: ‘it purifies them, it makes them 
innocent, it gives them a natural, eternal justification, it gives them a clarity which 
75 Ibid., p. 144; Kohn (2013).
76 Vermeylen (2017), p. 143.
77 Ibid., p. 157.
78 Serres (1995).
79 Hobbes (1968).
80 Vermeylen (2017), p. 158.
81 Ibid., p. 159.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Barthes (1972), pp. 107, 109–159, 124.
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is not that of an explanation but that of a statement of fact’.85 In Barthes’ example of 
the magazine cover the mythical concept is French imperialism; it is in no way hid-
den, but is rather on display.86 Yet there is continual oscillation between the meaning 
of the original sign (an African soldier saluting) and the signified concept (French 
imperiality) such that the concept is naturalised and thus made to appear unmoti-
vated.87 ‘[M]yth hides nothing’ because while a communication, like the magazine 
cover, can distort the meaning of its origin, it cannot make it disappear: ‘The French 
Empire? It’s just a fact: look at this good Negro who salutes like one of our own 
boys’.88
In this perspective, social evolutionary narratives in international environmental 
law naturalise, precisely by not justifying, a situation in which certain Western lib-
eral ideals of environmental ethics and law represent the developmental zenith of 
global governance. Fundamental tensions and apparent contradictions—that these 
ethics and laws arose in reaction to the worst excesses of capitalism without chal-
lenging its bases; that the countries progressing furthest along the evolutionary path 
are also the highest resource consumers and worst polluters; that Europeans, espe-
cially European males, have for centuries considered themselves at the zenith of eth-
ical and legal progress, even while colonizing the world and enslaving millions—are 
overcome by silence.
This reminds us of Levi-Strauss who argues ‘the purpose of myth is to provide a 
logical model capable of overcoming a contradiction’.89 He also notes that this is of 
course impossible if the contradiction is ‘real’. From this perspective, myth plays the 
vital role of enabling a denial of choice supressing fundamental contradictions into a 
shared cultural subconscious. There is a deeper, mythical significance here wherein 
for readers of social evolutionary narratives who consider themselves both civilized 
and concerned for nature—a positive nexus emerges that appears natural and eternal 
despite the otherwise blatant contradiction: The more alienated from nature a soci-
ety, the more civilized it is. And civilized people are at one with Nature.
3.2  Sociobiology
The second variation of evolutionary narrative in contemporary international envi-
ronmental law is founded in sociobiology. Robinson has recently combined the 
notion of the Anthropocene, genetic evolution and environmental law in a novel 
sociobiological legal theory. Initially, Robinson’s writing on law and evolution drew 
only metaphorically upon evolutionary concepts. His theory of evolved norms repre-
sents something qualitatively different.90 In The ‘Ascent of Man’: Legal Systems and 
the Discovery of an Environmental Ethic, Robinson uses a passage from Darwin’s 
85 Ibid., p. 124.
86 Ibid., p. 115.
87 Hiley (2004), pp. 838–860, 840.
88 Barthes (1972), pp. 120, 124.
89 Levi-Strauss (1965), p. 105.
90 Robinson (2014a), p. 46.
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famous work to justify the claim that humans may not yet have attained their evolu-
tionary zenith:
The main conclusion arrived at in this work, namely that man is descended 
from some lowly organised form, will, I regret to think, be highly distasteful to 
many […] Man may be excused for feeling some pride at having risen, though 
not through his own exertions, to the very summit of the organic scale.91
The danger of descending into the intellectual territory occupied by Robinson 
in his more recent work is drawn into clear focus by revealing what the ellipsis 
eclipses.92 Darwin’s inability to apply a hint of self-reflection to the torture, slav-
ery, violent patriarchy, gross inequity or the central influence of religious mysti-
cism inherent in his own society and its empire, was typical of his generation.93 To 
be clear, we do not suggest that Robinson shares, at any level, Darwin’s nineteenth 
century attitudes to racial hierarchies but instead argue, along with others such as 
Gould, that this is the thin ice upon which one necessarily stands when attempting 
to link instrumentally ideas of global legal change and human genetics.94 Wherever 
the discussion may commence, so often it concludes in a Panglossian equation: The 
Familiar = The Civilized = Highly Evolved.
Despite the title, The Ascent of Man is best described as an essay linking develop-
ments in North American and international environmental law to an argument sug-
gesting the ethical vision set out by transcendentalist Emerson is coming to pass. By 
the time he authored Evolved Norms: A Canon for the Anthropocene, Robinson’s 
ideas around law and evolution relied explicitly upon sociobiology.
Sociobiology identifies traits of human nature, which jurisprudence should 
regard as ‘evolved norms’. Based on evolved norms, humans cultivate com-
mon legal expectations to guide behavior, which they in turn confirmed as 
general principles of law. Once evolved norms are recognized as organizing 
principles for how human communities and countries make choices about gov-
91 Darwin (1891), p. 398, as quoted in Robinson (1998), p. 497.
92 But there can hardly be a doubt that we are descended from barbarians. The astonishment which I 
felt on first seeing a party of Fuegians on a wild and broken shore will never be forgotten by me, for the 
reflection at once rushed into my mind—such were our ancestors. These men were absolutely naked and 
bedaubed with paint, their long hair was tangled, their mouths frothed with excitement, and their expres-
sion was wild, startled, and distrustful. They possessed hardly any arts, and like wild animals lived on 
what they could catch; they had no government, and were merciless to every one not of their own small 
tribe. He who has seen a savage in his native land will not feel much shame, if forced to acknowledge 
that the blood of some more humble creature flows in his veins. For my own part I would as soon be 
descended from that heroic little monkey, who braved his dreaded enemy in order to save the life of 
his keeper, or from that old baboon, who descending from the mountains, carried away in triumph his 
young comrade from a crowd of astonished dogs—as from a savage who delights to torture his enemies, 
offers up bloody sacrifices, practices infanticide without remorse, treats his wives like slaves, knows no 
decency, and is haunted by the grossest superstitions. Darwin (1891), p. 398.
93 Typical, but not inescapable as illustrated by de Montaigne in On Cannibals, an essay penned 
300 years prior to Descent of Man: ‘We may, then, well call these people barbarians in respect to the 
rules of reason, but not in respect to ourselves, who, in all sorts of barbarity, exceed them.’ (de Mont-
aigne 1580).
94 Gould (1978), p. 530.
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erning, they can help induce widespread cooperation for bolstering ecological 
and social resilience.95
As suggested above, the sociobiological turn in Robinson’s work triggers foun-
dational problems. First, the evidence presented by Robinson’s key sources, drawn 
from the fields of sociobiology and evolutionary psychology, is highly contested.96 
At a more fundamental level, applying sociobiological findings to substantiate 
claims about law and morality is highly problematic, as Brown explains:
The notion that morality is in our genes and activated by specific parts of our 
brain—thus qualifying as a ‘universal moral grammar’ or as ‘a gadget, like 
stereo vision or intuitions about number’ excites book reviewers, who can be 
relied upon to hail it as revolutionary. However exalted these claims, though, 
they prove to be of limited utility when trying to make sense of everyday moral 
practice in a given milieu.97
Robinson’s ideas are at times not easy to follow: ‘While evolved norms do not 
compel any country’s particular social, cultural, political, or legal human constructs, 
all legal systems do reflect the operation of evolved norms when crafting rules, pro-
cesses, and institutions’.98 Here he suggests that evolved norms are already inherent 
in all contemporary legal systems, yet the constructive project remains a worldwide 
recognition of them:
Human reactions to a changing Earth will emerge […] reflecting traits of 
human nature that evolved through Darwinian natural selection and evolution. 
These instincts are ‘hard-wired’ into Homo sapiens. As ‘evolved norms’, they 
motivate human behavior. By magnifying positive instincts to cope with the 
emerging conditions of the Anthropocene, humans can select evolved norms 
that advantage their well-being, and even survival.99
The first evolved norm Robinson proposes is cooperation, which he considers to 
be ‘both an ethical norm and a duty of good neighbourliness, acknowledged to be 
a customary norm in all legal systems (e.g., droit de voisinage)’.100 Robinson notes 
that at the international plane, cooperation is ‘a universally accepted principle of 
international law, reflected in Articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter’.101 
The basis for cooperation does not arise from the coercive force of the law, but 
rather in an inherent desire or instinct: he argues ‘[g]overnments and individuals 
alike instinctively cooperate when providing mutual aid for disaster relief, for exam-
ple amidst the intense storm impacts influenced by climate change’.102 He refers to 
95 Robinson (2014a), p. 48.
96 Gould (1978); Kennedy (2014), p. 12.
97 Brown (2008), p. 363.
98 Robinson (2014a), p. 58.
99 Ibid., p. 61.
100 Ibid., p. 18 (italics in the original).
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
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sociobiological scholarship as describing the evolutionary foundations for coopera-
tion, citing a range of sources from Bowles and Gintis through to Darwin.103
It is beyond doubt that all human social institutions, including law, are founded 
in cooperation. A more interesting question is whether it is wise to draw norma-
tive conclusions from this fact. Warfare and genocide also rely upon high levels of 
complex cooperative endeavour, as does organized crime, tar sands mining and seal 
hunting. When Franklin announced ‘either we hang together, or assuredly we will 
all hang separately’ both the revolutionaries and the hangmen were actively cooper-
ating. All this goes to illustrate that sociobiology may be able to explain why male 
lions kill cubs or why ants do what they do, but it inevitably becomes highly specu-
lative when applied to people.104 The issue of importance for international environ-
mental law scholarship is not whether people and states are apt to cooperate, but 
rather with whom and to what legal end. When extended to those questions, sociobi-
ology’s capacity to provide meaningful answers is very limited.
While Robinson does not claim that there is actual sociobiological evidence 
for most of the seven evolved norms he identifies, he does suggest that there is a 
sociobiological basis for them, stating that the evolved norms are not only real but 
also instinctual and hard-wired.105 Moreover, he suggests that the Anthropocene 
demands action to promote these norms, even in the absence of evidence:
In order to benefit from—and test—the hypothesis that humans can adapt more 
effectively to disruptions in the Anthropocene Epoch by magnifying positively 
their evolved norms, communities and countries will need to use these norms 
before sociobiology can confirm the evolutionary basis for the legal principles 
discussed here. Events are overtaking humanity.106
The essence of Robinson’s constructive project appears to be that ‘international 
environmental law should encourage aspects of human behaviour that promote bet-
ter outcomes for the environment and here are some examples familiar to me’. If 
evolution were removed from the equation, few would object to that. It is the pro-
ject’s grounding in evolution, not metaphorically, but through actual genetic pro-
cesses for which there is no sound evidence, which renders his assertions not simply 
unjustified, but perilous.
3.3  Neoromanticism
The third variation of the evolutionary narrative in contemporary international envi-
ronmental law is neoromanticism. Romantic mythopoeia of an ecological variety 
commenced in reaction to the Industrial Revolution and continued strongly there-
after.107 From Tolkien to television advertisements for SUVs, Westerners surround 
103 Ibid.
104 Gould (1978), p. 532.
105 Emphasis added. Robinson (2014a), pp. 47, 61.
106 Ibid., p. 53.
107 Von Hendy (2002), pp. 25–48.
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themselves with stories affirming their natural affinity with nature, even while con-
suming it ever more rapidly.108 While the cinematic spawn of The Hero’s Journey 
continues to make billions for media corporations,109 our favourite in this genre 
remains Wordsworth:
The world is too much with us; late and soon,
Getting and spending, we lay waste our powers:
Little we see in Nature that is ours;
We have given our hearts away, a sordid boon!
The Sea that bares her bosom to the moon;
The winds that will be howling at all hours,
And are up-gathered now like sleeping flowers;
For this, for everything, we are out of tune;
It moves us not.–Great God! I’d rather be
A Pagan suckled in a creed outworn;
So might I, standing on this pleasant lea,
Have glimpses that would make me less forlorn;
Have sight of Proteus rising from the sea;
Or hear old Triton blow his wreathed horn.110
In examining the origins of international environmental law, Humphreys and 
Otomo demonstrate that key concepts underpinning international environmental law 
were developed by classical romantic thinkers and ‘the expression of those concepts 
was both novel and essential to the romantic ésprit itself’.111 They identify three dis-
tinct guises in which romantic ideas regarding man and nature maintain a real, if 
typically concealed, influence upon contemporary international environmental law: 
the aesthetic, the authentic and the divine.
The extent to which such a subjective and culturally bounded notion as the aes-
thetic remains influential in how international environmental law is both formulated 
and applied—which it very obviously does—indicates the degree to which European 
values continue to dominate the discipline, even at its surface. Romantics defined 
themselves in opposition to much that they witnessed as the Industrial Revolution 
unfolded before them, but their construction of the authentic individual as a solitary 
figure silhouetted against the landscape in harmony with the bases of her own work 
product shared with the protocapitalists a deep antagonism to communal life, com-
munal labour and communal property.
But it is the romantic emphasis upon the divinity of nature—and of locating 
divinity in nature—that is most significant for present arguments. ‘It is not merely 
that God is or resides in nature. It is rather that the experience of the divine is locat-
able only through imaginative immersion in the natural world.’112 In this perspective 
108 Curry (1998).
109 Palumbo (2014), p. 92.
110 Wordsworth (1807).
111 Humphreys and Otomo (2014), p. 8.
112 Ibid., p. 11.
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humans who are both part of nature, and apart from it, construct divine Nature 
mythopoetically. ‘“Nature itself” turns out to owe everything to the imaginative 
authorial voice pronouncing upon it’.113
The world is too much with us reveals each of these elements. Wordsworth’s soli-
tary poet stands upon a lea that is pleasant, looking out upon an ocean in search of 
an embodied divinity that both he and the pagan know exist within it. Yet it is the 
pagan’s creed that is outworn; only a lone poet remains to deliver our gospel.
Humphreys and Otomo proceed to observe, ‘where international environmental 
law prizes the “intrinsic value of nature”, the “nature” in question will often turn 
out to be vague or unlocatable’.114 Moreover, we contend, influential theoretical per-
spectives informing the discipline continue to rely upon romantic notions that an 
authentic international environmental law is only attainable upon its subjects experi-
encing an epiphany revealing to them a particular set of beliefs, or myths.
In international environmental law scholarship, the publication of The Great 
Work by Thomas Berry in 1999 may be considered a neoromantic landmark. In 
this extraordinary work, Berry calls for a radical reconfiguration of the dominant 
conceptualisations of law and existing systems of governance so that they are able 
to support the health and integrity of the whole Earth community. Members of the 
organized academic school—the Earth Jurisprudence Movement (EJM)—regularly 
cite Berry as their key source for a philosophy that recognises Earth as a primary 
source of law and which treats ecological sustainability as a fundamental legal prin-
ciple.115 Earth Jurisprudence is founded on principles that emphasise human inter-
connectedness with the Earth in its efforts to serve as the foundation of a new legal 
system in which ‘Human laws and Earth laws are brought together’.116 Berry’s work 
has enjoyed a recent surge in popularity among environmental law scholars who 
favour a natural law approach. This rise in interest is largely owed to the 2002 pub-
lication of Wild Law, a pop-law environmental treatise by Berry’s devotee Culli-
nan.117 Referring to The Universe Story by Swimme and Berry, Cullinan claims that 
a productive human governance system is achievable only through a conscious rec-
ognition of humans as part of nature to the extent that patterns in nature must neces-
sarily be studied and used to inform such a system.118 Cullinan uses the seemingly 
contradictory heading, Wild Law, to introduce the need to overcome the dichotomy 
between ‘nature’ and ‘civilisation’, ‘wild’ and ‘law’.119 Wild law is portrayed as an 
approach to human governance and a manifestation of Earth Jurisprudence insofar 
as it recognises all the human and non-human qualities of the Earth System.120
113 Ibid., p. 12.
114 Ibid.
115 Alexander (2014), p. 31.
116 Berry (2002).
117 Cullinan (2002).
118 Ibid., p. 26.
119 Ibid., p. 30.
120 Ibid.
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Berry in The Great Work, and together with Swimme in The Universe Story, 
attempts nothing less than a ‘comprehensive story of the universe’.121 The story 
elaborates how, unlike in ancient times, in the modern period ‘with all our learning 
and with our scientific insight, we have not yet attained such a meaningful approach 
to the universe’.122 Berry unites concepts drawn from physics, theology, astronomy, 
chemistry, biology, history, mythology and psychology in a tortured and florid prose 
that, for the believer, does indeed explain the origin and purpose of all life and mat-
ter in the cosmos from the beginning of geological time into an indeterminate eco-
utopian future:
The narrative of the universe, told in the sequence of its transformation and in 
the depth of its meaning, will undoubtedly constitute the comprehensive con-
text of the future.
‘The Universe Story’ […] is the great story taking place throughout the uni-
verse. This creative adventure is too subtle, too overwhelming and too mys-
terious to ever be captured definitively. Thus we are telling it with a certain 
hesitancy.123
Throughout both volumes Berry manages to effectively conceal this hesitancy. 
He did not need ESS to propose the designation of a new geological era. Instead he 
simply does it himself by proposing that this new period should be called the ‘Eco-
zoic’, which he believes indicates ‘the order of magnitude of the change that is tak-
ing place and of the expanded role of the human’.124 Just like the Anthropocene, the 
Ecozoic is an age in which history is erased:
A new type of history is needed, as well as a new type of science […] gone 
is the period when the various civilisations could be explained through the 
sequence of their political regimes, and the listing of battles fought and treaties 
made. The period is gone when we could deal with the human story apart from 
the life story, or the Earth story, or the universe story.125
Evolution is at the heart of Berry’s cosmology; it is our sacred story:
Now in our modern scientific age, in a manner never known before, we have 
created our own sacred story, the epic of evolution, telling us, from empirical 
observation and critical analysis, how the universe came to be […] then how 
the earth took shape and brought us into existence.
With all the inadequacies of any narrative, the epic of evolution does present 
the story of the universe as this story is now available to us out of our present 
experience. This is our sacred story.126
121 Berry (1999); Berry and Swimme (1992), p. 5.
122 Berry and Swimme (1992), p. 6.
123 Ibid., p. 5.
124 Ibid., p. 4.
125 Ibid., p. 2.
126 Berry (1999), p. 31.
459Primal Scene to Anthropocene: Narrative and Myth in…
123
From this foundation, Burdon and Cullinan propose natural law theories positing 
the existence of a Great Law or Great Jurisprudence.127 The ‘Great Jurisprudence’ 
contains law or principles that govern the functioning of the universe. These princi-
ples are timeless and unified, all derived from the same source, namely the universe 
itself.128 Earth Jurisprudence is embedded in this Great Jurisprudence.129 Given the 
consideration of the Great Jurisprudence as ‘“written into” every aspect of the uni-
verse’, it is seemingly evident that rational analysis is not the only means through 
which we obtain knowledge as we for the most part rely on interactions we have 
experienced with nature through history.130 In other words, there exist a seemingly 
endless variety of ways, other than conducting a rational analysis of information, to 
discover the Great Jurisprudence. This makes it virtually impossible to identify its 
precise content and boundaries. Nonetheless, the essential task of all subordinate 
law is to find consistency with the Great Law.131 That Burdon and Cullinan invest so 
much intellectual capital in Berry’s ideas, and that Cullinan in particular is himself 
so influential, testifies both to the degree to which neoromantic mythopoeia remains 
active and stirring within contemporary environmental jurisprudence, as well as to 
the pervasiveness of the evolutionary trope.
In summarizing the discussion on the prevalence of evolutionary narratives in 
environmental law theory, an observation deserving emphasis is that there is noth-
ing new or unusual about lawyers using evolution as a metaphor for legal change 
and development. As Eliot notes, however, only alternative narratives open oppor-
tunities to ‘initiate conversations about law which involve types of human beings 
and environments radically different from those we know’.132 It is precisely evolu-
tion’s location on a mythical plane that allows it to transcend the violent and con-
tested historical events that constitute past legal change. In principle, legal authors 
can meaningfully theorize about the evolution or adaptation of law within a juris-
diction, or group of jurisdictions, whose citizens broadly share histories, values, 
worldviews and narratives that shape their understanding of legitimate authority. 
However, evolutionary legal theory is a very different beast when presented on a 
species-wide basis. This brings us to the second narrative pillar of contemporary 
international environmental law: universal evaluations of nature and constructions 
of legal subjectivity.
127 Cullinan (2002); Burdon (2015); Burdon (2012), p. 28.
128 Cullinan (2011), pp. 77–78.
129 Ibid., p. 78.
130 Ibid., p. 79.
131 Burdon (2015), p. 85.
132 Eliot (1985), p. 94.
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4  The Myth of Universalism
Universalism in legal theory is found wherever propositions are not accompanied 
by express or implied limits upon their application to specific jurisdictions, regions, 
cultures, language groups, etc. The collective noun ‘humans’ is a signpost to an 
author’s universal intent; the species-encompassing ‘we’ points in the same direc-
tion. All the perspectives considered in the previous section are universalist. Beyond 
species-encompassing language, as regards evolved norms, genetic theories cannot 
avoid universalism except to argue that humans are differentiated into subspecies. 
EJM, despite resistance to such suggestions from Bosselman and Cullinan, is struc-
turally within a classical natural law tradition that demands universal obedience to, 
in this case, the Great Law.133 EJM, founded uncritically upon the work of Berry, 
seems also to require adherence to Berry’s unique cosmology.
An immediate reaction of some readers confronted with a critique of universal-
ism is to assume the author is writing from a perspective of either absolute moral 
relativism or some kind of ‘classical cultural relativism’. Assumptions of that kind 
in the present instance, and in most cases, are responses to straw men since few 
contemporary scholars, within or outside anthropology, support the kind of relativist 
positions originally presented by students of Boas.134 Scholars have for some dec-
ades, especially within discourses surrounding human rights, worked towards under-
standings of cultural difference that allow for the existence of human universals. In 
this body of scholarship cross-cultural dialogues have been identified as an appropri-
ate response to universalism, while ‘cross-cultural procedural criteria to distinguish 
a progressive politics from a regressive politics, empowerment from disempow-
erment, emancipation from regulation’ provide a sound response to relativism.135 
These lessons have insufficiently shaped international environmental law scholar-
ship, however, which remains susceptible to what Todorov dubbed ‘unconscious 
universalism’.136
Unconscious universalism in international environmental law discourse appears 
in various guises. One approach is to present competing perspectives within a sin-
gle intellectual heritage—often referred to as ‘Western’—in language that oscil-
lates between the specific and the universal without building either boundaries or 
bridges between them.137 When conclusions are drawn, however, they apply to all 
133 Burdon (2015), pp. 80–92.
134 Brown (2008), p. 363.
135 De Sousa Santos (2002); also Petersen (2011).
136 Todorov (1992), p. 71.
137 For example, Burdon (2015) uses the descriptor ‘Western’ throughout the analysis, except that pre-
scriptions are for humans, not westerners. Bosselmann recounts ‘the legacy of the European cosmol-
ogy’ and bemoans the ongoing influence of Descartes and the Enlightenment for having bequeathed 
contemporary society an inheritance of ‘dualism, anthropocentrism, materialism, atomism, greed, and 
economism’. He discusses experiences in New Zealand and Germany but does not mention, much less 
describe, intellectual traditions other than European or European settler societies. See also Bosselmann 
(2010), pp. 2424, 2430.
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of humanity.138 Of the perspectives considered, Cullinan’s is the most insightful as 
it describes variable evidence supporting claims by Berry and others that ‘our tribal 
ancestors “lived in harmony with nature”’, and concludes that ‘there is little hard 
evidence that all contemporary and ancient hunter-gatherer societies were ecologi-
cally benign’.139 He warns against ‘the temptation to portray some of these peoples 
as inherently wise “noble savages” whom we have displaced from Eden’.140 Cullinan 
suggests the experiences and worldviews of indigenous peoples are significant, not 
because they point to a universal ethic of harmony with nature, but rather because 
they contain and illustrate extraordinary human normative diversity—the thousands 
of social and legal alternatives potentially available to all of us as humans—to the 
dualism, materialism and atomism about which he, Bosselman and others com-
plain.141 The challenge for Cullinan, having recognized and emphasized cultural 
diversity, is in recovering and returning to the universal project. This is not unique; 
it is almost inevitably encountered by natural law theorists attempting to account for 
cultural diversity, as explained by Brown:
The moral principles offered by universalists tend to be sufficiently abstract 
that they flirt with triviality, as in ‘societies everywhere hold that human life 
is sacred and cannot be taken without justification’. A statement such as this 
is not exactly wrong, but it is not particularly useful either, given the range of 
circumstances that qualify as justification in diverse cultural settings. A con-
text-sensitive application of natural law would require heroic feats of casuistry 
to encompass the varied circumstances of humankind. The result, I suspect, 
would begin to look a lot like—relativism.142
Cullinan’s particular casuistry:
[O]nce we recognise the universe, like a dance, exists by virtue of the coopera-
tive relationships between all involved, it must follow that our governance sys-
tems should focus on fostering and nurturing intimate relationships between 
the members of the Earth Community. […] How one determines whether or 
not this is the case can vary, provided that it is consistent with the Great Juris-
prudence. The Great Jurisprudence itself not only recognizes, but insists upon, 
diversity.143
We see here that ‘the Great Jurisprudence’ is ultimately a universalising concept 
rendering the initial recognition of the diversity that characterises social systems 
almost meaningless. The result is a return to the universal legal subject which tends 
to be presented as European, male, privileged, educated and rational.144 Braidotti 
138 Bosselmann (2010), p. 2442.
139 Cullinan (2002), p. 95.
140 Ibid., p. 97.
141 Ibid.
142 Brown (2008), p. 368.
143 Cullinan (2002), p. 132.
144 ‘European’ includes European settler-dominant societies. See Blaut (1993).
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explains how this universal subject results in sexualised and racialised ‘others’ being 
excluded from the notion of ‘humanity’ and calls for ‘[s]ituated and immanent prac-
tices’ that ‘allow for sharper and grounded analyses’ of power differences.145 As our 
discussion of myth and narrative shows, the need for such analysis in legal scholar-
ship relating to the Anthropocene is becoming increasingly pressing.146 Here it is 
worth noting that international environmental law actually does resist universalism, 
most notably through the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities.147 As Sands and Peel explain, this principle entails a recog-
nition of the common responsibility of states for environmental protection on the 
one hand, and for ‘differing circumstances, particularly in relation to each state’s 
contribution to the creation of a particular environmental problem and its ability to 
prevent, reduce and control the threat’ on the other.148 Together with other princi-
ples of international law, most notably sustainable development—or ‘development 
that meets the needs of the present generations without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs’149—it provides a framework for envi-
ronmental protection while at the same time reducing inequality within and between 
states, and across present and future generations. The imperative to correct condi-
tions that prevent or impair the equal enjoyment of human rights also follows from 
international human rights law.150
Among the most problematic outcomes of an uncritical acceptance of the mythic 
beast—Anthropos151—as the universal legal subject are claims that responsibility for 
the global climate and biodiversity crises is shared on a species-wide basis whereby 
differing levels of responsibility for these crises are downplayed or ignored. For the 
ESS, a repeated method of illustrating the Anthropocene is by presenting a dual 
series of figures representing a correspondence between ‘increasing rates of change 
in human activity since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution’, and ‘increas-
ing rates of change in the Earth System as a result of dramatic increase in human 
activity’.152 Correlations between the figures are undeniably apparent. Overlooked 
by Crutzen and Steffen, however, are other key facts and figures that are nonethe-
less relevant to understanding the origins and drivers of the Anthropocene. Perhaps 
most notably, these include the statistics illustrating the correspondence between 
colonialism and slavery with the commencement of the Industrial Revolution and 
subsequent growth in economic activity. Here are the calculations included by Said 
145 Braidotti (2019), p. 156.
146 Grear (2017). See also Hayman (2018).
147 See especially United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Art. 3(1) and 
Paris Agreement Art. 2(2).
148 Sands and Peel (2012), p. 233 (italics in the original).
149 Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, ‘Our Common Future’ (1987), 
p. 43 (the Brundtland Report).
150 See e.g. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 18: Non-Discrimination, HRI/GEN/1/
Rev.9 (Vol. I), adopted 10 November 1989, para. 10. See also De Schutter et al. (2012).
151 A term coined by Grear; see Grear (2015), p. 225.
152 Steffen et al. (2011).
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in Culture and Imperialism that if presented graphically could themselves match 
Crutzen’s j-curves:
[I]n 1800 Western powers claimed 55 percent but actually held approximately 
35 percent of the earth’s surface, […] by 1878 the proportion was 67 percent, 
a rate of increase of 83,000 square miles per year. By 1914, the annual rate had 
risen to an astonishing 240,000 square miles, and Europe held a grand total 
of roughly 85 percent of the earth as colonies, protectorates, dependencies, 
dominions, and commonwealths.153
The relationship between colonialism, slavery and the growth of early capitalism 
is well researched, and widely acknowledged in Third World Approaches to Inter-
national Law (TWAIL) scholarship and decolonial critical theory. Nonetheless, it is 
generally disregarded by the ESS authors, but as shown by critics such as Malm and 
Moore, the connections are far from irrelevant, both prior to and during the birth of 
the Industrial Revolution.154 Steam engines replaced water mills to power the cot-
ton mills of early industrial England primarily because they facilitated mill-owners 
greater access and control over human labour.155 The milling machinery only oper-
ated with long-fibre cultivars selected over millennia by indigenous farmers in South 
America and South Asia.156 Attaining cheap cotton produced through the forced 
labour of slaves transported to America from Africa was essential. The colonies sup-
plied both raw materials and markets to fuel the engine of emerging global capi-
talism.157 Coal burning warships liberated naval arsenals from relying upon wind, 
widening and accelerating European colonization and enabling the United States to 
defend its slave trade.158 At the birth of the Industrial Revolution, and at every turn 
thereafter—from the forests of Brazil and Papua New Guinea, to fields of cotton in 
Alabama or sugar cane in Fiji and Queensland, to the oil wells of Somalia and the 
Middle East—one finds the domination of nature by people enmeshed and inter-
twined with the domination of people by people. In the plain words of the essayist 
Heglar:
In the environmental space, we love to tell ourselves that it all started with 
the Industrial Revolution. But we’re telling ourselves a lie. It started with con-
quest, genocides, slavery, and colonialism. That is the moment when White 
men’s relationship with living things became extractive and disharmonious.159
For Morrison, the Eurocentric foundation underpinning the Anthropocene ‘rep-
resents an effort to expand European historical experiences, frameworks and chro-
nologies into the rest of the world […] and hides a disturbing extension of colonial 
153 Said (1994), p. 8.
154 Malm (2016); Moore (2017); Malm and Hornborg (2014), p. 63. See also Grear (2017).
155 Malm (2017).
156 Russell (2014).
157 Williams (1944), pp. 51–58.
158 Black (2007), pp. 173–174; Karp (2011).
159 Heglar (2019).
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discourse’.160 Rather than revealing a revolutionary post-Cartesianism, ‘the ter-
minology of the “Anthropocene” simply extends the logics of Eurocentric human 
exceptionalism and methodological individualism’.161 Instead of standing as an all-
encompassing concept, the Anthropocene’s exclusions are in fact characteristic of 
the mythic Anthropos insofar as patterns and structures of privilege concurrently 
persist. Ultimately, ‘the species remains as much an abstraction at the end of the line 
as at the source’.162 Braidotti notes that ‘[t]here is something ironic to say the least 
in the spectacle of European civilization, that was the cause of so much devastation 
and multiple extinctions in its colonial occupied territories, becoming so concerned 
about the extinction and the future of the species’.163 Indeed, the conditions of con-
cern in most scholarship on the Anthropocene are all too familiar for many people in 
the Global South and marginalized parts of the Global North.164
Where the inherent irony of the discourse is overlooked and colonial history is 
misrepresented or simply ignored, responsibility becomes—conveniently for some—
shared between us all: You and I, the worker in the Dongguan factory where the pen 
on our desk was manufactured and the Kudjip villager in a threadbare Global Brand 
shirt who picked the beans for the coffee we are drinking, the street hawker sell-
ing chotpoti opposite the Dhaka sweatshop where the shirt was sewn, the Kakuma 
seaman crewing the ship that brought the fertilizer to grow the chotpoti pulses, the 
girl from Juba who spent her childhood in the refugee camp the seaman walked by 
on his way to school, the CEO of the Manhattan company that owns the shipping 
line, the family in Coban awaiting remittances from the woman who cleans his Fifth 
Avenue office and the child begging for quarters a few blocks away. Our ancestors 
and our children as well. It would include societies who leave lighter imprints on 
the planet than did most even in pre-agricultural phases, such as people living on 
certain remote Pacific atolls in Micronesia and Kiribati who never had electricity 
until a recent solar installation provided a single light for each house at night.165 
Hundreds of kilometres of deep ocean separate them from the nearest government 
agent, except perhaps a local nurse or primary teacher. They still follow lifeways that 
enabled their ancestors to thrive in one of the world’s most marginal environments 
for millennia. If we are to accept claims that such people share in what Philippopou-
los-Mihalopoulos terms ‘the Anthropocene responsibility’,166 then it must be that 
this has nothing to do with choices, actions or impacts and is instead a direct and 
inescapable function of simply being human. In this way, a species-encompassing 
Anthropocene threatens to finally eclipse those elements already well concealed in 
international environmental jurisprudence: history, culture, language, class, power, 
160 Morrison (2015), p. 76.
161 Grear (2017), p. 79.
162 Ibid., p. 83; Malm and Hornborg (2014), p. 63.
163 Braidotti (2019), p. 157.
164 Ibid. (citing Clarke 2018).
165 Federated States of Micronesia, ‘Second National Communication to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change’ (Palikir, FSM Government, 2012), p. 115. Sacks (1997) provides a good 
description of life on a remote Micronesian atoll, Pingelap.
166 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos (2017), p. 120.
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biocultural diversity, scale both temporal and physical, and the persistence of a plu-
rality of legal forms.
As Yussof sums it up, the Anthropocene deploys humanity ‘as a method of eras-
ure that obfuscates climate racism, social injustice in fossil fuels, and differentiated 
histories of responsibilities through homogenization in a “we” of the Anthropo-
cene’.167 It distributes blame where none is due thereby suppressing and devaluing 
lived examples of how people in fact exist in a manner that is fully human, inti-
mately connected with their neighbours and local environments, and entirely within 
the Holocene’s limits. Concealing these different levels of diversity through a uni-
versalising narrative risks inadvertently perpetuating existing inequalities. These 
mechanisms of unequal distribution are illustrated increasingly clearly by the actual 
and projected impact of climate change. Projections indicate that developing coun-
tries will bear an estimated 75–80% of the cost of climate change, while having ben-
efited the least from the industrial activities that have caused the climate crisis.168 
People in poverty will be worst affected, as they tend to be both more vulnerable and 
more exposed to climate impacts.169 Wealthier communities have greater capacity to 
adapt to the effects of the changing climate170 in large part because of the benefits 
reaped from the extraction and exploitation that contributed to climate change.171 
Alston warns of a ‘climate apartheid’ in which those who have benefited most from 
activities that caused the climate crisis will ‘pay to escape overheating, hunger, and 
conflict while the rest of the world is left to suffer’.172 Laying bare the differentiated 
responsibilities and impacts associated with climate change and ecosystem degrada-
tion is an initial step towards what Braidotti describes as ‘the co-construction and 
also the counter-construction of affirmative values and relations’ which, in turn, can 
propel radical political change.173 In the realm of international law, this requires a 
move away from the ‘western, elitist, male-centered and imperial’ nature of the field 
towards a more inclusive practice embracing the transformative potential of social 
movements.174
5  The Myth of Legal Monism
The final narrative pillar of contemporary environmental law is what the anthro-
pologist Rouland describes as ‘the unitary myth’ of all law being derived from the 
state.175 Davies argues that this is not an explicit theory of monism but rather ‘the 
167 Yusoff (2015), pp. 6–7.
168 See World Bank (2010), p. xx.
169 Human Rights Council, ‘Climate Change and Poverty: Report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme 
poverty and human rights’, UN Doc. A/HRC/41/39 (2019), p. 7.
170 Ibid., p. 14.
171 Ibid.
172 Ibid., p. 50.
173 Ibid., pp. 168, 172 (quote from p. 168).
174 Rajagopal (2003), p. 23.
175 Rouland (1994), pp. 44–46.
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thought or ideal of singularity’ imbued with cultural, ethical, ideological and aes-
thetic dimensions.176 It underpins ‘the intellectual context of legal philosophy and 
the picture of law conventionally manifested in legal scholarship’.177 Griffiths’ con-
struction of ‘the ideology of legal centralism’, presented in contrast to legal plural-
ism, typifies such attitudes:
Law is, and should be, the law of the state, uniform for all persons, exclusive 
of all other law, and administered by a single set of state institutions. To the 
extent that other, lesser normative orderings, such as the church, the family, the 
voluntary association and economic organization exist, they ought to be and in 
fact are hierarchically subordinate to the law and institutions of the state.178
Davies argues that both the positivist and natural law theoretical streams are 
based upon a notion of singularity, that ‘there is One law in a particular geo-political 
space and that the One law is itself One system, defined by clear limits, governed by 
certain principles and unified by a distinct foundation’.179 Griffiths agrees that the 
‘pervasive power of this legal centralist or formalist model of law is such that it may 
be said that all legal studies stand in its shadow’.180 In international environmental 
law, it manifests in a conception of the international legal order where supposedly 
neutral, rational states facilitate environmental protection and achieve ‘sustainable 
development’. TWAIL scholarship has been instrumental in illuminating the man-
ner in which this conception downplays and ignores the power dynamics affected by 
these internationally prescribed objectives.181
A rejection of the myths of legal monism and the ‘neutral’ state defines a plural-
ist legal perspective, which regards law to be ‘not what the lawyers say about it’ but 
‘what the actors make out of it’.182 For a pluralist, ‘[l]aw is not in the texts, it is in 
the practices’.183 Legal pluralism thus signifies a societal characteristic of multiple 
legal orders observable in a given society.184 Looking beyond practices, Manderson 
suggests that not only are the daily activities of people in streets, villages, work-
places and homes the sites of ‘interpretative battles over the meaning and functions 
of law’ as much as courts, parliaments and lecture halls, but that people’s invisible 
worlds are also contributing to each individual’s construction and experience of law; 
‘law is synonymous with the symbolic order, it is produced in the dialogue and dis-
course all about us: in all the things that we read and say, in the music we listen to, 
and the art we grow up with’.185 Writing on international law, Rajagopal specifically 
draws our attention to the role of social movements in its practice. He argues that 
176 Davies (2005), p. 90.
177 Ibid.
178 Griffiths (1986), p. 3.
179 Davies (2005), p. 92.
180 Griffiths (2002), p. 293.
181 See e.g. Rajagopal (2003), p. 22.
182 Le Roy (1994), p. 4.
183 Ibid.
184 Griffiths (1986), p. 38.
185 Manderson (2003), p. 87.
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appreciating this role similarly requires an understanding of the state as ‘a plural and 
fragmented terrain of contestation rather than as a monolith’.186
While legal pluralism has informed the theoretical frameworks of most legal 
anthropological studies of both Western and non-Western cultures for some decades, 
most international environmental scholars continue to couple ‘law’ inexorably to 
the sovereignty of the state. This is problematic as it disregards the ways in which 
colonial administration ‘contributed to the complexity and diversity of plural legal 
configurations’ and more recently, the impact of ‘ever-increasing global connected-
ness’ on how the state itself is viewed.187 Legal anthropological studies situated in 
colonial and post-colonial situations provided the core of the literature on legal plu-
ralism until, and to some degree since, the 1980s. From that time authors have also 
applied the notion of legal plurality in analyses of non-colonised jurisdictions, and 
more recently there have emerged arguments suggesting that the recognition of legal 
pluralism implies a shifting of perspective that could potentially displace and reori-
ent all legal theoretical bases: ‘legal pluralism must be approached not as another 
legal theory but as a radicalization of the way we think about the law, which must 
permeate and inform all theorizing of the law’.188 This radicalization may involve 
openness ‘to develop the sensibility as concerned activists’ on the part of interna-
tional lawyers.189 For feminist international law scholars, it further involves ‘the per-
missive model of international State sovereignty, as encapsulated in the Lotus case, 
giving way to a preference for co-operation and peaceful measures’.190
At the normative level, an attitude of legal pluralism also creates space for a much 
larger variety of norms that may be employed to devise cooperative solutions to the 
global climate and biodiversity crises. For example, Hayman and her Carcross/Tag-
ish First Nation collaborators demonstrate in recent work how the ‘slow activism’ 
inherent in indigenous Tlingit and Tagish narratives can be employed to deconstruct 
and reshape definitions of the Anthropocene associated with mono-cultural repre-
sentations.191 In some Pacific Island nations, local systems of customary resource 
use are increasingly recognised as valuable normative approaches to environmental 
management as communities are seeking to cope with the adverse effects of climate 
change and wanting to reverse the unsustainable exploitation of marine resources.192 
These local systems are often undervalued or ignored in international environmental 
law, in part because they tend to be located in oral histories and other forms of intan-
gible cultural heritage differing starkly from formal legal sources. Recognising these 
systems as capable of informing international environmental law and management 
strengthens the ‘constructive, creative capacities of legal subjects […] alongside the 
plurality of these same subjects’ so that the re-conception of law becomes a form 
186 Rajagopal (2003), p. 23.
187 Von Benda-Beckmann and Turner (2018), pp. 255, 258.
188 Melissaris (2004), p. 58 (emphasis in the original).
189 Rajagopal (2003), p. 23.
190 Chinkin et al. (2019), p. 28.
191 Hayman (2018).
192 Ruddle et al. (1992); McMillen et al. (2014); Rose (2008).
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of ‘emancipatory prescription’.193 This critical legal pluralist attitude is perhaps the 
most powerful way to work methodically towards the inclusion of the cultural diver-
sity of today’s world in international environmental jurisprudence, as opposed to the 
homogenising outlook and solutions the Anthropocene discourse seeks to impose 
upon the world.
6  Conclusion
Readers will by now recognize that the Anthropocene narrative contains all of the 
necessary elements of an international environmental law myth. It commences in a 
prehistoric state of nature; subsequent events are set in motion via a tragic moment 
of enlightenment and are the inevitable outcomes of evolutionary processes. Like 
the Mirror of Galadriel, it is a bountiful repository of self-reflecting narratives; a 
tapestry of tales united by a special thread—each includes only one character who 
is thereby, at the whim of each storyteller, able to inhabit the roles of hero, villain, 
trickster, victim, god and demigod, often shifting roles in a single telling. This char-
acter is, of course, Anthropos; the universal human, the human enterprise, us; and 
we are educated, privileged, rational, white, male, heterosexual and able-bodied. In 
essence, the Anthropocene provides the most recent chapter in a legal mythology 
that reduces historical and contemporary facts of empire, slavery, gross inequity of 
wealth and power, patriarchy and global capitalism to the natural course of human 
evolution.
Readers may have also located a contradiction in arguments presented thus far 
inasmuch as they endorse existing principles of international law against proposed 
radical revisions conducted under an Anthropocene banner: viewed through this lens 
all international law is revealed to be equally mythic. This is of course the case; 
modern international law is the product of humanity’s greatest schism—unprece-
dented slaughter in global warfare, mass genocide and colonial violence. The pre-
cious infant that is the UN system is the progeny of more pain, blood and death than 
any other legal birth. Texts such as the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights are undoubtedly, perhaps even self-consciously, mythopoetic. From 
the Gamali of Pentecost Island to the International Court of Justice in The Hague, 
law’s creator and subject is always Homo relator—the storytelling ape—and it is 
the myriad of stories we tell each other and ourselves that define our law, and us. 
International law is itself a repository of stories, the best of which aspire to be global 
tales of universal emancipation utilising the normative weight and efficacy of inter-
national law as a system while at the same time calling for reform.194 Ultimately, 
these authors believe that while we cannot escape myth, the post-Holocene will be 
shaped by those myths that are best loved.
193 Kleinhans and Macdonald (1997), p. 26.
194 Noteworthy in this context is the campaign to establish ‘ecocide’ as a fifth international crime. See 
Higgins, Short and South (2013).
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Against this backdrop, it is paramount to acknowledge that the Myth of the 
Anthropocene is playing an innately conservative role in contemporary international 
law discourse. Maintaining and reinforcing this narrative may become even riskier 
as the post-Holocene advances. To take a single example, we may contemplate the 
near-certainty of a massive increase in migration either as a direct result of environ-
mental catastrophes, or caused by human conflicts in which ecological degradation 
is a contributing factor195 and the fact that borders in places such as Europe, the US 
and Australia are already being militarized against asylum seekers.196 Every post-
Holocene regime, of any conceivable description, is likely to maintain or develop 
some form of environmental jurisprudence justifying such militarization as neces-
sary and virtuous. What use might a post-Holocene authoritarian regime make of 
some of the ideas inspired by evolution re-emerging with renewed vigour having 
been tied to the Anthropocene brand? Any sociobiological turn in international law 
must be resisted for obvious reasons, and renewed neo-romanticism must also be 
viewed with great scepticism, as Humphreys and Otomo warn:
the romantic development, from Wordsworth to Yeats, tends increasingly to 
fasten the lone authorial voice to an imaginative didacticism, itself centred on 
a community steeped in a landscape with nostalgic Volk-ish contours. The pro-
nounced conservativism that marks the later Wordsworth develops into delib-
erate elitism in Yeats (the ‘last romantic’) and flirts with full-blown authori-
tarianism in Heidegger—arch-philosopher of the ‘authentic’. The imaginative 
dismissal of the human in much environmentalism may, in short, lend itself to 
dictatorial law, as indeed happened in 1930s Germany.197
A mere 90  years hence neo-romantic ideas are offering nourishment to what 
Klein terms ‘white power eco-facism’ emerging against a backdrop of ecological 
breakdown, and acting as ‘a ferocious rationalization’ for refusing to provide justice 
to those who are victims of this catastrophe.198 In other words, instead of repairing 
the harm done to these victims as required by basic human rights principles, we risk 
ending up with islands of defended and privileged security amidst a sea of suffering 
and uncertainty.199
If the Anthropocene remains a topic of analysis, international environmental law 
scholarship needs to grapple in more depth with the questions posed by Hayman 
and her Carcross/Tagish First Nation collaborators: ‘Whose Anthropocene is it? 
195 Werell and Femia (2013).
196 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Concluding observations on the fifth periodic 
report of Australia’, UN Doc. E/C.12/AUS/CO/5 (2017), p. 4.
197 Humphreys and Otomo (2014), p. 13. Notably, the reference to 1930s Germany was omitted from the 
final version of the chapter cited above (n. 113).
198 Klein (2019), p. 45.
199 Ibid; Malm and Hornborg make the same argument: Malm and Hornborg (2014), pp. 66–67. See also 
David Boyd, ‘Safe Climate: Report of the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment’, 
UN Doc. A/74/161 (2019), p. 10 (citing evidence that climate impacts ‘could push an additional 100 mil-
lion people into extreme poverty by 2030’).
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How has it been defined, and who gets to own it?’.200 These questions offer a use-
ful starting point for confronting the species-talk—the universal ‘we’—that features 
prominently in contemporary international environmental law discourse more sys-
tematically with indigenous, feminist, postcolonial and other marginalised accounts 
of normativity. Taking these accounts more seriously will almost inevitably result 
in greater modesty in the discipline’s epistemological aspirations. At the same 
time, each of them could provide new perspectives on the questions posed in the 
legal literature on the Anthropocene, such as the extent to which legal orders ‘can 
be adjusted through additional layers of norms—such as environmental law—or, 
instead, require a deeper reformulation of foundational concepts’.201 The theory and 
practice of international law would benefit from the plurality of perspectives thus 
heeded. At the same time, rather than dismissing existing principles of international 
environmental law—such as sustainable development—as ‘ideological palliatives’, 
perhaps it is time to remove apparent yet invisible ideological veils thus revealing 
the actual principle and its transformative potential.
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